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Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax:
Crown v. Commissioner
Section 2501(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pro-
vides that "a tax ... is hereby imposed on the transfer of property
by gift . . . by any individual, resident or nonresident." This gift
tax was primarily designed (1) to discourage income-splitting among
family members and (2) to ensure the effectiveness of the estate tax by
preventing the depletion of the taxable estate before death.! In Crown
v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court faced the issue of whether substantial
interest-free loans made to trusts for the benefit of children and other
relatives of a taxpayer constituted taxable gifts of the use of the funds.
The Tax Court held for the taxpayer, from which holding the govern-
ment has appealed. This Case Comment will examine the background
of this decision and suggest various modes of analysis under which a
different result might obtain.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The taxpayer and his two brothers, Robert Crown (now deceased)
and John J. Crown, were equal partners in Areljay Company, Not
Incorporated, an Illinois general partnership formed in 1944. Separate
trusts existed for the benefit of the fifteen children of the Areljay
partners and for a first cousin and eleven children of first cousins of
the Areljay partners. During 1967, Areljay made various interest-free
loans to twenty-four of these trusts,3 the aggregate sum of the loans
being $18,030,024 for the taxable year. The bulk of the amount
loaned was in the form of open accounts and was loaned for the pur-
pose of enabling the trusts to acquire an interest in Henry Crown and
Company, Not Incorporated. Some of the loans were evidenced by
demand notes. These demand notes made no provision for payment
of interest before demand, but did provide for interest of 6% per annum
after demand. The prime rate of interest on the market averaged 5.63%
for the year 1967.
The Internal Revenue Service found the taxpayer's statement
of 1967 gifts to be deficient to the extent of $362,135.92. This figure
represents one-third4 of the Service's estimate of the value of the use
1. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 457, 477;
S. REP. No. 655, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 525. For further
references to legislative intent, see C. LOWNDES, R. KRM.ER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL EsTATE
AND Gr'r TAxes 640 n.ll (3d ed. 1974).
2. 67 T.C. 1060, appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. July 1, 1977).
3. Gifts made to a trust are treated as gifts to the beneficiaries of the trust and not as gifts
to the trustee or to the trust as a legal entity. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941).
4. A gift by a partnership will probably be taxed to the individual members of the partner-
ship in proportion to their interest in the property transferred. This is by analogy to Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 643, 645-46 which provides that a gift by a
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:903
of the funds transferred by the three partners of Areljay. The valua-
tion of the use of the funds was based on a "reasonable rate of in-
terest"' of 6% per annum.
The issue thus presented to the Tax Court (in a reviewed opinion)
was whether the making of interest-free loans under these circum-
stances was a taxable event under the gift tax laws. A divided court6
found that it was not, following Johnson v. United States. The court
reasoned (1) that the position of the Service is a new one and that its
enforcement would work an unfair surprise on the taxpayer, (2) that
the purpose of the gift tax (to prevent depletion of the taxable estate)
would not be frustrated, since the principal would be repaid, (3) that
"the right to interest must arise from an express or implied contractual
obligation or from statute,"s (4) that the interpretation sought by the
Service was so broad that only Congress, and not the courts, could
authorize it, and (5) that, as a matter of policy, the application of gift
tax law to "inter-family sharing of use of property" would be "ad-
ministratively unmanageable." 9
The dissenters found that "[t]o hold that such a transfer is not a
taxable gift . . . ignores economic reality,"' t and contested the view
that the purpose of the gift tax was not being defeated by the majority's
holding."
corporation is taxable as gifts by the individual shareholders in proportion to their holdings
in the corporation. There are no cases on point. Thus, although the gift in Crown was from a
partnership to a trust, it is comparable to cases in which the gift is from one individual to
another. See note 3 supra.
5. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1061, appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir
July 1, 1977).
6. The decision was six to four. Judges Simpson, Raum, Tannenwald, and Wilbur dis-
sented. Judges Drennen, Quealy, and Hale did not participate in the decision.
7. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
8. 67 T.C. at 1064 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1065.
11. Id. at 1069-70. Judge Simpson, citing no authority, stated that the portion of a note
includible in the estate of a decedent is the total amount of the note discounted to present
value. Since in the case of an interest-free loan, the only amount to be discounted is the princi-
pal itself, the amount includible in the estate will be less than the armount that was transferred
out to the borrower. This may be contrasted with the normal interest-bearing instrument, for
which a discounting of all future interest and principal payments results in a present value
theoretically equal to the original principal amount. Under this line of reasoning, Judge
Simpson argues that the interest-free loan results in a depletion of the taxable estate, whereas
the normal interest-bearing loan does not. This argument is problematical for three reasons,
First, it is not entirely clear that the estate would not also be depleted when interest-bearing
notes are discounted, since what is being discounted in either case 's what the creditor has a
right to receive. Thus, discounting in either case produces a figure lower than the amount
that the creditor's estate has a right to receive. Second, and more importantly, Judge Simp-
son appears to have assumed that the depletion of the estate must be :;hown in order to establish
that a taxable gift has been made. But the gift tax is two-pronged. It is designed to prevent
not only the depletion of a decedent's estate before death but also to tax transferred gains to the
recipient (here, the interest-free use of money) for purposes of income-splitting. See text ac-
companying note I supra. Third, and most importantly, the method used by Judge Simpson
for the valuation of notes held by the estate is not the correct one. Valuation of notes for estate
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II. THE LEGAL MILIEU: TAXPAYER SUCCESSES,
SERVICE NONACQUIESCENCE
From the broadest perspective, the issue involved in Crown can
be viewed as an example of a conflict that is a recurring theme in
federal tax law: that of form versus substance. This section will
examine the form versus substance conflict as it has developed in
the context of the specific issue presented in Crown. In form nothing
permanently passes to the debtor when an interest-free loan is made,
for the entire principal eventually returns to the creditor; in substance,
the debtor has received the use of the funds, the value of which is
commonly known as interest.
Narrowing the perspective, Crown can be compared to those'cases
in which the Service has sought to impute interest or rent when no
such interest or rent was actually charged or paid. The courts have
been reluctant to accept this point of view. In Tennessee-Arkansas
Gravel Co. v. Commissioner 2 a corporation allowed a company that
it controlled to use certain equipment rent-free. Although section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary or his delegate
to "distribute, apportion, or allocate" gross income among commonly
controlled entities "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income of any of such organizations," the Sixth Circuit
refused to allocate or impute rental income to the corporation, de-
claring that the Commissioner had "set up income where none ex-
isted."13  Eleven years later in Smith-Bridgman and Co.,' 4 the Tax
Court refused to impute interest on $247,774 worth of noninterest-
bearing loans made by a parent corporation to a subsidiary. Thus,
even armed with section 482, the Service had twice failed to success-
fully assert an imputation of income.1 5  It subsequently nonacquiesced
on the issue of the propriety of imputation.
1 6
In J. Simpson Dean,7 a case cited by the Crown majority, the Tax
tax purposes is governed by Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4, T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, 482. That
regulation provides that the value of notes shall be presumed to be the unpaid principal amount
plus interest accrued to the date of death. Therefore, the estate would not be "depleted" even
in the case of an interest-free loan, since the value includible in the estate would be the same
principal amount that had previously been transferred out.
12. 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
13. Id. at 510.
14. 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acq., 1951-1 C.B. 3; accord, Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 598 (1971); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
15. More recent cases have interpreted § 482 and its corresponding regulations to require
the imputation of interest in the case of certain interest-free commercial loans. However,
these decisions have usually come about only through reversal of the Tax Court position on
appeal. For an extensive analysis of these cases consult O'Hare, 7he Taxation of Interest-
Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1085, 1096-105 (1974).
16. Rev. Rul. 67-79, 1967-1 C.B. 117. The Service maintains that it acquiesced in Smith-
Bridgman and Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel only because it had misallocated income in those
cases. The actual authority to allocate under § 482 was reasserted.
17. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
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Court applied the Smith-Bridgman logic to a situation involving loans
to shareholders. A corporation eighty percent controlled by the tax-
payers made interest-free loans to the taxpayers in excess of two
million dollars. The court reasoned that any imputed income from
the use of the funds would be offset by a deduction for the payment of
the interest, 18 and so, apparently believing imputation and offset to be
a pointless exercise, disallowed the imputation. The fallacy of that
argument was pointed out by Judge Bruce in his dissent in Dean.19
It is that not all interest expenses are deductible, the most notable
exception being those interest expenses incurred for the purchase of
tax-exempt bonds. 20  Yet Dean remains law.2 1
Within the gift tax area specifically, Johnson v. United States22
stands as the only case directly on point. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson had
made bona fide but noninterest-bearing loans in excess of one half
million dollars to their two children. For the four taxable years in
question, the Internal Revenue Service claimed that the Johnsons had
made gifts of the use of the money to the extent of 3.5% per annum on
the average unpaid balance for each year. In language that has been
described as "elliptical and conclusionary" 23 the district court found
no gift of the use of the funds. The court based its holding on the
reasoning that "[t]he right to interest must arise from an express or
implied contractual obligation or from statute. 24 From a policy point
of view, the court was very concerned about the law's intrusion into
family relationships:
The time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at
arm's length with his children when they finish their education and start
out in life. There is no legal requirement, express or implied, to charge
them interest on money advanced to them at that stage, whether it be to
open a law office and hang out a shingle, to go into the oil'business on a
substantial scale, or to begin life on their own in some other way. The
fact that the Johnsons were financially able to make substantial loans to
their children does not change the principle involved. It is to the credit
of the entire family that children of those wealthy parents had the judg-
18. I.R.C. § 163.
19. 35 T.C. 1083, 1083-92 (1961) (Bruce, J., dissenting).
20. I.R.C. § 265(2). Furthermore, it would seem more in accord with a logical and har-
monious tax procedure to establish the income that had been realized and then make deductions
as allowed. Stating that income does not exist because the Code provides a corresponding
deduction simply creates a shortcut to the presumed destination it does not reflect the
analytical process required by the Code itself in the determination of the tax liability.
21. Dean has not been well received by commentators. See, e.g., J. SNrED, TiU CON-
FIGURATIONS OF GROSS INcoME 86-88 (1967); O'Hare, supra note 15,at 109,4-96;Schlifke, Taxing as lt-
come the Receipt of Interest-Free Loans, 44 TAxEs 544, 544-47 (1966).
22. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
23. 19 STAN. L. REv. 870, 870 (1967).
24. 254 F. Supp. at 77. The court cited no authority on this point.
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ment to use their money in such a way that they were able to repay
almost the entire loans during their father's lifetime.
The court further noted, as did the Crown majority, that the interpre-
tation sought by the Commissioner should come from Congress and
not the courts.
Aside from its assertion in 196726 (following Smith-Bridgman)
that it would continue to impute interest under section 482, the In-
ternal Revenue Service remained silent on this issue until 1973. In
that year the Service issued Revenue Ruling 73-61,27 the essence of
which provides that "[t]he right to use property, in this case money, is
itself an interest in property, the transfer of which is a gift within the
purview of section 2501 of the Code unless full and adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth is received."'2  The ruling
specifically stated that Johnson would not be followed.29  This posi-
tion was amplified later in 1973 when the Service issued its non-
acquiescence to Dean.30
Thus were the lines of conflict drawn when the Internal Revenue
Service sent Lester Crown his notice of a gift tax deficiency in 1974.
Against this background of taxpayer successes and Service nonac-
quiescence the issue in Crown was once again argued and, with a
strong admixture of stare decisis, once again resolved in favor of the
taxpayer.
III. FINDING THE GIFT: A ROUNDTABLE ANALYSIS
The conclusion that the making of an interest-free loan should
be viewed as a gift of the use of the funds can be arrived at by a variety
of means. The purpose of the discussion that follows is to provide a
brief introduction to some of the modes of analysis that might be
25. Id.
26. It is surprising that the Service did not appeal Jolhson. See 5 Hous. L. Rev. 138, 142
n.28 (1967) in which the author suggests that the decision not to appeal may have been the
result of an inadequate development of the facts in the trial court.
27. 1973-1 C.B. 408.
28. Id. at 409. - The facts underlying the ruling are as follows. a father advanced S250,000
to a corporation wholly owned by his son, for which the son gave his father two promissory
notes from the corporation; the first note, payable in ten years, was for S50,000; the second
note was a demand note for the amount of S200,000; both notes provided that the principal sum
was to be repaid without interest.
As to the term note, the ruling found that "the value of the right to use of the money loaned
is ascertainable by accepted actuarial methods." Id. As to the demand note, the ruling found
the value of the use to be properly ascertainable only on a quarter-by-quarter basis, according
to the actual period of use allowed.
29. Cited in favor of the Service's position was the anomalous but eminently reasonable
Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). In that case the taxpayer sold a building to her
children and accepted in payment a note carrying a very low interest rate. She was held to
have made a gift to her children of the difference between the interest charged and the local
market rate of interest.
30. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
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employed by the Service in its effort to move the substance of Reve-
nue Ruling 73-61, a bone of contention in Johnson and Crown, into
the peaceful repose of settled law. Crown is now on appeal to the
Seventh Circuit.3'
A. "Property" By Definition
The proposition that the use of money is an item subject to
transfer under section 2511, and thus taxable, can be accomplished
directly through a process of statutory interpretation. Note first the
broad language of section 2511(a) as it defines a taxable transfer:
"[t]he tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is
in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible." The legis-
lative history of the gift tax provisions demonstrates further that
"property" was to be broadly interpreted to include "every species of
right or interest protected by law and having exchangeable value,"'
'2
That the use of money has an "exchangeable value' is commonly
known, and the value of this use is commonly known as interest. It
would indeed be difficult to refute the idea that such a value exists when
the total credit market debt in the United States exceeded $2.5 trillion
in 1975.13  The more philosophical, less statistically-minded lawyer
might prefer the approach of the sage New Hampshire court which
found simply that "[i]n the final analysis, the property in anything
consists in its use."
34
A similar position has been taken by the Service. Revenue Rul-
ing 73-61 states that "[t]he right to use property, in this case money,"3 5
shall be deemed to be property in itself, and thus subject to transfer
for purposes of the gift tax. This wording would place money in the
same category as such familiar items of property as houses, cars, and
yachts, the use of which as a form of compensation has consistently
been held to generate income to the user.36 It is difficult to distinguish
between the use of ordinary property and the use of money; the
consumption of either results in a gain to the individual. Thus, an
31. No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. July 1, 1977).
32. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B, 457, 477;
S. REP. No. 566, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 524,
33. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIlE UNITED STAT1S: 1976, tt
749 (97th ed. 1976).
34. Barker v. Publishers Paper Co., 78 N.H. 571, 573, 103 A. 757, 758 (1918).
35. 1973-1 C.B. 408-09 (emphasis added).
36. See United Aniline Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963) (use of corporate-
owned yacht by president and principal stockholder); International Artists. Ltd. v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 94 (1970) (use of corporate-owned mansion by employee Liberace); O'Neill v. Patterson,
65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9436 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 1964) (use of employer-owned autos),
(Vol. 38:903
INTEREST-FREE LOANS
equal application of basic concepts of value in the income and gift
tax areas would seem to require that the use of money be recognized
in administration of the gift tax as an item of property subject to
transfer. The argument of the Crown majority that the application of
the gift tax law to intra-family sharing of the use of property would be
"administratively unmanageable 37 is substantially refuted by the
generous annual and lifetime exemptions provided by the Code.38
B. The Revocable or Short-Term Trust
Suppose a taxpayer sought to confer a benefit on a family member
or other person in a way that would ensure a steady income for that
person and yet not tie up a large sum of money indefinitely. The most
ordinary means to achieve this end would be to establish a revocable or
short-term trust. The intended beneficiary will receive payments from
the income of the corpus, while the corpus remains available either at
the will of the grantor or within a term established by the grantor."
Suppose, however, that the taxpayer in the above situation had
opted for the making of an interest-free loan instead of a trust. Func-
tionally, the situations are the same:40 the intended beneficiary has
the use of the funds for producing income, while the taxpayer has the
funds immediately available (on a demand note, analogous to the
revocable trust) or available at a time of his choosing (on a term note,
analogous to the short-term trust). The tax effect, however, will be
quite different. In the trust situation, the taxpayer must pay gift taxes
on any payments made to the beneficiary before revocation or termina-
tion; by the Johnson/Crown rule, on the other hand, no gift is recog-
nized in the interest-free loan arrangement.
This disparate tax treatment of two substantially similar rela-
tionships raises questions about the wisdom of Johnson and Crown.42
37. 67 T.C. at 1064.
38. See note 91 infra.
39. The trust hypothesized here has been included as an aid to the analysis, and not as a
representation of a "typical" trust arrangement. An actual taxpayer would be more likely to
create a trust which satisfied the "no strings" requirements of I.R.C. §§ 673-677 thereby ensuring
that the income of the trust would be taxable to the trust, and not to himself. Thus, a taxpa)er
would ordinarily prefer not to retain a reversion, I.R.C. § 673(a), or a power to revoke, I.R.C.
§ 676, that would be effective or exercisable within 10 years. For an introduction to the prob-
lems facing the settlor who wishes to avoid taxation of the trust income to himself without
relinquishing all semblance of control over the trust, see Westfall, Trust Grantors and Section
674: Adventures in Income Tax Avoidance, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 326 (1960). Note how the
absence of the above-mentioned restriction makes the interest-free loan a comparatively more
attractive means of conferring a benefit even before any consideration of the tax advantage.
40. There are many situations, of course, in which the settlor/donor requires that the
funds be professionally or at least objectively managed. In those instances, the interest-free
loan would not be a feasible alternative to the trust.
41. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 643, 648-49.
42. See O'Hare, supra note 15, at 1091-93; 65 Micit. L REv. 1014, 1017-18 (1967); 19
STAN. L. REv. 870, 875-76 (1967).
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At the least, this apparent inconsistency would seem to place a burden
on a court to either distinguish the two situations factually or, al-
ternatively, to declare the justifying policy. Conservative estate
planners may therefore choose not to rely on Crown in spite of the
obvious tax advantage that can be obtained through the interest-free
loan.
43
C. Forgiveness of Indebtedness
The Internal Revenue Code44 has long provided that the forgive-
ness of a debt may result in income to the debtor,45 at least in those
situations in which the forgiveness did not qualify as a gift for the
purposes of section 102.46 In the gift tax area, taxable transfers have
been found when a part of the principal of a loan has been forgiven,47
and, more recently, when only the previously stated interest charge
has been forgiven.48  This latter development casts doubt upon the
Johnson/Crown logic. Suppose Areljay, Co., instead of making
interest-free loans from the start, had simply made conventional loans
to the twenty-four trusts and had later forgiven the interest on these
conventional loans. Although the transactions would be in substance
the same as in Crown, the tax result is different; that is, under existing
law a taxable transfer would have been made. Estate planners,
though perhaps hard put to explain such anomalies, must learn to
recognize those situations in which form seems to prevail over sub-
stance. This situation has led at least one estate planner to warn that
43. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXAtION
§ 2511, at 9-7 (3d ed. 1974) (the logic of Rev. Rul. 73-61 is "a difficult proposition to refute,
[I]t seems that the Service might be entitled to a legislative assist in support of its
basically reasonable position"). But see Horvitz, Planning an EfI&clive Gift-Givng Program,
10 INsT. EST. PLAN. 1700 at 17-1, 1706.2 at 17-31 (1976) (Service position is "harsh" and
"not supported by case law"); Snyder, Leading a Tax-Sheltered Life, 25 N.Y.U. INST. FtD. TAX.
765, 786 n.49 (1967) (Johnson was "correctly decided").
44. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
45. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
46. See Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
47. Janie Braddock Ogle, 36 B.T.A. 1329 (1937). The forgiveness of indebtedness may
not result in income to the debtor in certain other well-defined situations. For example, when
the relationship between the debtor and creditor is that of buyer and seller, the forgiveness may
be treated simply as a reduction in the purchase price. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656
(7th Cir. 1940). Furthermore, when the debtor remains insolvent after the forgiveness of
indebtedness, he may be deemed to have realized no income on the theory that "gain" begins
at the point of solvency. Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). Of similar import are
the regulations under § 61, which provide that no income is realized by a debtor whose debts
have been discharged under the Bankruptcy Act or under a commonI-law proceeding for debtor
relief, provided that the debtor's liabilities continue to exceed his assets immediately after the
discharge. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b), 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-12(b) (1977).
48. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975). Tie
regulations strongly suggest this result. See Treas. Reg. § 25.251 l-l~a), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 CAB,
627, 643 ("a taxable transfer may be effected by . . . the forgiving of a debt").
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if an interest-free loan is intended, it should be executed as such from
the start.49
It should be noted before leaving this topic that a conceptual
distinction can be made, and was made at trial,50 between the interest-
free loan and the forgiveness of indebtedness. The interest-free loan
arguably does nothing to diminish the lender's estate, since there was
never any legal right in the estate to receive interest. Following this
line of reasoning, the forgiveness of indebtedness, however, does re-
sult in a diminution of the lender's estate since the estate's legal right
to interest has been extinguished. The fallacy of this argument as
applied to the gift tax can be shown by an examination of the dual
purpose of the gift tax. Its purpose was not only to prevent depletion
of the estate before death (and thereby assure the efficacy of the estate
tax), but also to prevent income-splitting among family members (to
assure the efficacy of the income tax).51  Therefore, since both the
interest-free loan and the forgiveness of indebtedness result in a gain
to the debtor, the effect of either transaction should, in a family con-
text, be taxable under the second "prong" of the gift tax irrespective
of any gain or loss to the estate of the lender.
D. The "Split-Dollar" Insurance Plans
Under the typical "split-dollar" insurance plan, the employer and
the employee will share the costs of a whole-life policy on the life of
the employee. The employer pays a part of the premium equal to
the increase in the cash surrender value of the policy; the employee
pays the remainder. Upon the death of the employee or the sur-
render of the policy (usually when employment is terminated), the
employer receives that part of the proceeds equal to the cash sur-
render value; the beneficiary designated by the employee then re-
ceives the remainder of the proceeds.
This arrangement proved to be very popular.52 After the first
few years, the employee's portion of the premiums has diminished
49. Horvitz, supra note 43, 1700, at 17-32. The same warning is found in 46 J. T~x.
375, 376 (1977).
50. Brief for Petitioner at 20-23, Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, appeal docketed,
No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. July 1, 1977).
51. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
52. It also proved to be susceptible to abuse. See H.R. REP. No. 749. 88th Con&, 2d
Sess. 61 (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 (part 2) C.B. 125, 186:
The attention.of your committee has been called to instances %here life, or other,
insurance policies have been sold to individuals on the basis that they cost the indihidual
little or nothing, and in some cases on the grounds that they actually result in a net
profit for him. In such cases, the taxpayer each year borrows all, or a substantial part,
of the funds necessary to pay the premium on the policy. If he is in a 50( (or higher)
tax bracket, since the interest payments on such loans are presently deductible, the net
interest cost to him is one-half or less of the interest payments he makes. The annual
increase in the cash value of the insurance policy to reflect interest earnings, %hich
generally is not taxable to the taxpayer either currently or otherwise, is likely to equal
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considerably-perhaps even to nothing--5 3while policy coverage remains
in force. In this way employers could provide an attractive fringe
benefit, foregoing only the potential investment income of the "cash
value" funds.
Much impetus was given to such plans by Revenue Ruling 55-
713.54 This ruling treated the insurance arrangement as though the
employer had made annual loans without interest in an amount equal
to the annual increases in the cash surrender value.55 This analysis
would seem to comport with the substance of the transaction, since a
whole-life insurance policy is essentially nothing more than an invest-
ment of principal, the interest from which goes to pay for insurance
protection. Thus, the cash value of the policy was "loaned" to the
employee while he lived without any interest charge; the employee
then used the investment income from these funds to provide insur-
ance protection for his beneficiaries. Since the arrangement is essen-
tially an interest-free loan, the employee realizes no income under the
ruling.
The Treasury became concerned with the proliferation of the split-
dollar plans following Revenue Ruling 55-713. When Congress was
asked for assistance in 1962, its response was to suggest that a problem
that was administratively created, i.e., by Revenue Ruling 55-713,
could be administratively solved.56 The result was Revenue Ruling
64-328, which effectively plugged the income tax "loophole" of Reve-
nue Ruling 55-713. To accomplish this end, hDwever, the Service
employed some rather oblique reasoning. It purported to discard the
analysis of Revenue Ruling 55-713 described above, yet recognized
that, in essence, 't]he effect of the arrangement .. . is that the earn-
ings on the investment element in the contract are applied to provide
current life insurance protection to the employee from year to year,
without cost to the employee., 57  The Service thus took the position
that the employer is providing a benefit to the employee for which the
or exceed the net interest charges the taxpayer pays. Thus, for taxpayers in higher
brackets, where the annual increment in the value of the pzlicy, apart from the
premiums, exceeds the net interest cost of the borrowing, such policies can actually
result in a net profit for those insured. Because of this, some, insurance companies
have sold insurance policies under plans which provide for the taxpayer borrowing the
premiums either directly from the insurer, or from a bank or otherwise, primarily on the
grounds that the policies are tax-saving devices. Your committce doubts that the sale
of insurance on such a basis is either desirable or fair to taxpayers generally.
This language is repeated in S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong,, 2d Sess. 77-78 (1963), reprinted In
1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 505, 582.
53. See the chart in Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, at 14.
54. 1955-2 C.B. 23.
55. Thus, the employee received no income as a result of the employer's payments and
the employer received no deduction.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 52, at 62.
57. 1964-2 C.B. 11, at 13.
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employee is paying either very little or perhaps nothing. It proceeded
to value this benefit on the basis of what the employee would have had
to pay for one year of term insurance at the same level of coverage,
minus the payment actually made by the employee. Under the ruling,
this difference represents the income realized by the employee.
The Service is, of course, right that the employee has realized in-
come. However, its job would have been much easier had it not been
faced with the judicial resistance to the taxation of interest-free loans.
This resistance compelled the Service to characterize the split-dollar
plan in such a way that it would not appear to be merely the use of
funds (for insurance purposes), which in fact it is. Stated another
way, the illogical refusal of the courts to tax the use of money while
at the same time recognizing the concept of compensation in kind has
induced the Service, in Revenue Ruling 64-328, to make a distinction
where there is no difference.
5 8
Revenue Ruling 64-328 has not been judicially tested.59 The rul-
ing taxes split-dollar insurance, which is indistinguishable in substance
from an interest-free loan. If the Service succeeds in obtaining judi-
cial approval for this ruling, its argument for taxing all forms of inter-
est-free loans, including those between family members, will be
strengthened. 0
E. Section 483"s Imputation of Interest
Section 483 of the Internal Revenue Code imputes interest61 as a
component of certain deferred payments62 made in the sale or ex-
change of property. The purpose of section 483 was to equalize the
tax treatment of the seller who charged interest on deferred payments
and the seller who made no provision for interest but would simply fix
a higher selling price for the property. Absent section 483, this hid-
ing of the interest payments in the selling price would enable the seller
to have interest payments, usually taxed as ordinary income, taxed at
capital gains rates.63
58. See Schlifke, supra note 21, at 548.
59. Genschaft v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 282 (1975), would appear to support Revenue
Ruling 64-328, but in fact never reached the issue of the interest-free loan.
60. Indeed, many family arrangements are more directly suggestive of gift than income
tax problems. For examples of split-dollar arrangements within the family, see Snyder, supra
note 43, at 785 n.46.
61. Interest is currently imputed on payments to which § 483 applies at the rate of 7% per
annum, compounded semi-annually. Treas. Reg. § I.483(cX2Xii)(B), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B.
135, 137. Imputed interest rates under §§ 482 and 483 were raised in 1976 to "better reflect pre-
vailing interest rates." T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135, 135.
62. Generally, interest is imputed in the case of payments that are made more than six
months from the date of sale and that total more than S3000. See I.R.C. § 483(X1). (f)(1).
Thus, through the operation of a kind of de minimis rule, the familiar "90 days same as cash"
retail sales agreement escapes the imputation of interest.
63. The legislative history discloses Congress' disapproval of the interest-free loan as a
means of tax avoidance:
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The Johnson court made the assertion, repeated in Crown,64 that
"tlhe right to interest must arise from an express or implied contrac-
tual obligation or from statute., 65  Section 483, however, imputes in-
terest in situations in which interest is neither provided for by the con-
tract or required by state law. It is a "substance over form" provision.
In combination with section 482, which authorizes the Service to real-
locate income and deductions between related companies "in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of such com-
panies, section 483 pronounces clearly the legislative policy in favor
of recognizing the interest component of a transaction, even where no
interest is expressly stated.
The majority in Crown apparently found the issue of imputed in-
terest broad enough to embrace both the income and gift tax laws.
It cited failures 66 of the Service to enforce section 482 in support of its
decision not to find a gift of interest on the facts presented.6 7  It
would seem to follow that in future cases the Tax Court might be
Your committee sees no reason for not reporting amounts as interest income merely
because the seller and purchaser did not specifically provide for interest payments.
This treats taxpayers differently in what are essentially the sam- circumstances merely
on the grounds of the names assigned to the payments. In the case of depreciable
property this may convert what is in reality ordinary interest income into capital
gain to the seller. . . .Your committee believes that manipulation of the tax laws in
such a manner is undesirable and that corrective action is needed.
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1973), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 1251,
1961. This language is repeated verbatim in the Senate Report. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong,,
2d Sess. 102 (1973), reprinted in 1974-1 (Part 2) C.B. 505, 606.
64. 67 T.C. 1060, 1064, appeal docketed, No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. July 1, 1977).
65. 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Tex. 1966). The court's rejec'.ion of the rationale of B,
Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972), seems
especially questionable since that case specifically requires the imputation of interest in the
case of an interest-free loan and is the first of a line of cases taking that view. See Kerry
Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kaher Corp. v. Commissioner,
486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973); Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 15 (Nov. 9,
1977); Collins Electrical Co. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 911 (1977). These cases allocate in-
come or deductions between parents and subsidiaries in order to properly account for the bene-
fit conferred by the interest-free loans. Their relevance to the general issue in Crown is indi-
cated by the following statement from Kerr' Investment Co.:
When a taxpayer lends $500,000 to a wholly-owned subsidiary without interest, it is
obvious that the lender is likely divesting itself of interest income that it could have
earned by making interest-bearing loans in a competitive market. When such an inter-
est-free loan is made, we see no reason why an allocation of sonic income on the loan
should not be made to taxpayer even if the interest-free loan did not result in the pro-
duction of gross income.
500 F.2d at 109-10.
66. Eg., Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940);
Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acq. 1951-1 C.B. 3.
67. The court noted the more recent success of the Service in B. Forman Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 407 U.S. 934 (1972), but apparently found this case
unconvincing precedent in light of a Tax Court case, Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 957 (1973), affid on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1975). The court's reason-
ing here is unclear, since Fitzgerald upholds the allocation of interest under § 482 and cites
B. Forman as authority.
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persuaded to take cognizance of the policy expressed by section 483,
and, in doing so, reverse Crown.68
F. The Charitable Deduction for Interest-Free Loans
A relatively recent development in the area of deductions casts
some doubt on the holding in Crown. In Mason v. United States,," a
1975 decision from the Seventh Circuit, a taxpayer was allowed a
charitable deduction 0 for his failure to charge the market rate of inter-
est on a loan to a charitable organization.71 "Although," as co-coun-
sel for the taxpayer later noted, "this decision was favorable to the
taxpayer because it involved the question of a charitable deduction,
it may provide support for the position of the IRS that interest-free
loans . . . from one family member to another result in a taxable
gift for gift tax purposes."72 The taxpayer in Crown questioned the
applicability of an income tax precedent in a gift tax context.73  A
"strong congressional policy in favor of public philanthrophy," it was
argued, could justify the holding in Mason that a low-interest loan
resulted in a deductible charitable contribution without affecting the
gift tax status of a similar loan made to a family member. 74  How-
ever, there is no reason to believe that the underlying rationale of
Mason, a case decided by the same court to which Crown has been
appealed, might not be carried over into the gift tax area in the interest
of conceptual consistency. Furthermore, it can be persuasively ar-
gued that if the failure to charge interest is a sufficient donation to
qualify for the income tax deduction, it surely ought to qualify as a
gift for purposes of section 2511, which does not even require dona-
tive intent.
75
Of similar import to the problem of determining whether a gift
68. Section 482 has been construed by commentators to apply directly to the intra-family
loan situation. Under this analysis, members of the same family could be "controlled taxpay-
ers
'
" for the purposes of § 482 and the regulations thereunder. See Feinschreiber & Gram
well, IRS Imputes Interest on Loans Between Family Members, 51 TAxEs 294, 299 (1973).
69. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
70. I.R.C. § 170 allows a deduction for certain charitable contributions.
71. The facts stated in the text have been simplified. The taxpayer was one of three
stockholders of a corporation operating a blood bank. At the time this business was sold to a
charity, his interest in the corporation had a fair market value of 5117,000. In exchange for
his interest in the corporation, the taxpayer received S4,507.50 in cash and a note for SI 12,689A2,
payable in 20 annual installments at 4% interest. Discounted to the time of the transaction, the
4% note had a fair market value of only S81,000. Therefore, the taxpayer had transferred to a
charity property worth S117,000 and received in exchange cash and a note worth a total of
S85,507.50. The difference of S31,492.50 was the amount claimed as a charitable deduction.
72. Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing Interest Deduction Calls for Reappraisal of In-
terest-Free Loans, 44 J. TAx. 34, 34 (1976).
73. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, appeal docketed,
No. 77-1898 (7th Cir. July 1, 1977).
74. Id. at 7.
75. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1), T.D. 6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627, 645.
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has been made is Revenue Ruling 64-274.76 The relevance of this
ruling stems from the similarity between charitable activity and the
making of an interest-free loan, namely, that both involve the transfer
of a benefit without consideration or quid pro quo. In the ruling, a
nonprofit organization supplied housing, books, and instructional ma-
terials or loans without interest for the purchase of those items to
needy but deserving students. Advice was requested regarding
whether the organization was "organized and operated exclusively
for . . . charitable . . . purposes" and thus exempt from federal
income taxes under section 501(c)(3). The ruling found that the orga-
nization qualified for the exemption. It is not clear from the ruling
whether the making of interest-free loans alone would have qualified
the organization. However, since the language of the ruling included
the loan-making in the same category as other clearly charitable activ-
ities, it would not be unreasonable to make this inference.
G. Congressional Hostility Toward Interest-Free Loans
One curious note may be added 77 in evaluating the future of the
interest-free loan as a nontaxable transfer. This is, that whatever
Congress may think of interest-free loans between family members, it ap-
parently has no desire whatever to itself make such "loans" to indi-
vidual American taxpayers. In looking at the legislative histories of
some recent tax measures, one can find evidence of hostility to income
tax techniques that result in the equivalent of an interest-free loan
from the government. The 1969 Tax Reform Act, for example, im-
posed an interest charge on certain payments from accumulation
trusts. 78 The lawmakers reasoned that
this interest charge is necessary because, otherwise, the deferral of the
payment of the additional tax (i.e., from the time the income is taxed to
the trust until the time when the remainder of the tax is paid on the ac-
76. 1964-2 C.B. 141.
77. A section dealing with the imputation of interest in equity might also have been in-
cluded in the discussion. It is not difficult to find judicial generalizations to the effect that "in
practice a court should charge and allow interest in accordance with principles of equity in
order to accomplish justice in each particular case," Small v. Schunke, 42 N.J. 407, 415-16,
201 A.2d 56, 60 (1954). The problem of whether interest should be charged as an equitable
matter frequently arises in the assessment of damages. See 22 Am. JuR. 2d Damages §§ 179-94
(1965). For a citation to cases going both ways on the issue of imputing interest as an element
of damages, see 5 Hous. L. REv. 138, 141 n.25 (1967). However, tht application of equitable
principles in federal tax law is an uncertain matter at best, Perhaps the closest approximation
of "tax chancery" to be found in the cases is the occasional tendency of courts to invoke the
vague notion of "taxpayer equity" in support of a particular statutorD construction. See Haft
Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1975) (increase in administrative inconvenience
is tolerable when "taxpayer equity" is at stake).
78. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 331-32, 83 Stat. 487. An accumulation
trust is a trust which may accumulate income, there being no requirement to distribute all cur-
rent income. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.651(a)-i, 1.661(a)-I (1960).
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cumulation distribution by the beneficiary) amounts, in effect, to an in-
terest-free loan to the beneficiary by the government.79
The legislative histories of the 1969 changes on deductions for real
estate depreciation 8° and the 1976 changes on tax shelters8 ' included
the same complaint. These oblique references to the interest-free
loan do not bear directly upon any of the gift tax provisions. They
do, however, provide some indication of how Congress might respond
to the issue in Crown in that they are founded on the assumption that
an interest-free loan does in fact confer a benefit of some kind that is
free of taxation to the recipient. Both the Johnson and the Crown
courts stated that the initiative on the gift tax issue rested with Con-
gress and not the courts. The indirect application of the legislative
histories referred to above, while certainly representing no "initia-
tive" on the specific gift tax issue, might, in combination with the ad-
ministrative opinion expressed in Revenue Ruling 73-61, 82 work to
convice some courts that the legislative intent behind the gift tax
supports the interpretation sought by the Internal Revenue Service in
Johnson and Crown.
IV. THE VALUATION PROBLEM
Should a gift be found, the next task is to value it. This section
will examine the rationale behind and the problems attending some
of the possible approaches to valuation.
Revenue Ruling 73-61 states that "[tihe rate of interest that would
represent full and adequate consideration may vary, depending on the
actual circumstances pertaining to the transaction."8 3 Further, on the
facts of the ruling (a term note from a son to his father) it was found
that "the value of the right to the use of the money loaned is ascer-
tainable by accepted actuarial methods, as of the date the money and
the note were exchanged, and is, therefore, subject to the gift tax at
that time.", 4  Thus, the ruling suggests a variable "fair market
value" approach at the outset, but then ambiguously refers to the reg-
85 8
ulations, which provide for a flat 6% rate.86  A number of approaches
79. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 326 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 505
(emphasis added).
80. Id. at 326, 1969-3 C.B. 628.
81. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1975), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 717.
82. 1973-1 C.B. 408.
83. Id. at 409.
84. Id.
85. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5.
86. The reference here is apparently intended as an example only. Certain of the regula-
tions under § 25.2512 deal with the valuation for gift tax purposes of annuities, life estates,
terms for years, remainders and reversions. In the case of interests that are dependent on the
continuation or termination of more than one life, or for which there is a term certain concur-
rent with one or more lives, or in which the retained interest in the donor is conditioned upon
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to the problem of valuation might be taken under this nebulous stan-
dard.
One approach would be to tax the donor only to the extent that in-
come was actually produced by the funds. This approach is strictly
the most logical in that it recognizes only the benefit actually con-
ferred upon the borrower; moreover, it is a much fairer approach when
the donor has restricted the uses to which the funds may be put.
8 7
However, this analysis runs contrary to the general business notion
that the use of money is something that has a value whether or not it
is wisely invested,8 8 and also might prove administratively impracti-
cal in cases in which the gift funds have been widely dispersed in a
complicated investment program.
A "fair market value" approach seems to be suggested by the
references to varying conditions and "actuarial methods." This ap-
proach has a certain appeal when the object is to determine what
rate would have been charged in an arm's-length transaction. For
example, in the situation in which a father himself borrowed money
to make an interest-free loan to his son, it might seem appropriate to
use the interest rate that the father actually paid as the value of the
gift. However, this analysis fails to recognize that the true "market"
situation would be one in which the son himself hed obtained the loan
in an arm's-length transaction. Thus, where the ,son has no substan-
tial assets with which to secure the loan, the loan would have been
at a very high rate of interest or perhaps would not have been made
at all. The "fair market value" approach therefore presents two
problems; first, ascertaining what the market rates of interest were
and, second, determining the configurations of a hypothetical debtor-
creditor relationship.
Administratively, then, the most attractive alternative is simply
to value the gift at a flat rate prescribed by the regulations. 9 As one
commentator has noted,90 this will still permit some degree of gift tax
avoidance when the market rates remain above the prescribed rate.
Here, the Service must balance the possibility of tax avoidance
against the potential savings in administrative costs and the benefits
of added predictability.
survivorship, the regulations apply a flat 6% rate to values determined by reference to actuarial
tables. This 6% rate is the rate provided for by Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9(e) (1970), which is ap-
parently the intended citation. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5, T.D. 7077, 1970-2 C.B. 183, 188-92,
applies only to transfers after December 31, 1970.
87. See Schlifke, supra note 21, at 551.
88. See generally cases cited note at 65 supra.
89. Cf. Kahler v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1973) (wht'n parent corporation bor-
rowed money in the marketplace at more than 5% and then re-loaned tie money interest-free to a
subsidiary, the Commissioner imputed income at a flat 50% rate).




Under Crown and its earlier incarnations, it is clear that means
exist by which the use of an apparently unlimited amount of property
can be transferred free of federal gift taxes, at least within a family
setting. The vehicle for this transfer is the interest-free loan. In
failing to recognize the taxable quality of this transaction, the Tax
Court assumed a position contrary to the broad principles of federal
taxation, as comparisons with analogous income tax situations demon-
strate.
Crown now awaits disposition in the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. On behalf of the taxpayer it might be argued that
the Tax Court holding serves the policy against intrusion into the fam-
ily unit and the policy in favor of gift-giving in general. However,
the impact of these arguments ought to be diniinished by the exclu-
sions from the tax that have always been provided by the Code. They
permit a great deal of gift-giving91 before threshold levels of taxation
are reached, and thus contribute directly to the recognition of the pro-
taxpayer policies just mentioned.
In the future, the courts should carefully scrutinize the interest-
free loan in order that they might discern more clearly the economic
realities involved.92 The use of money is a manifestly valuable and
highly sought-after commodity in a sophisticated, modern economy.
The transfer of this use without full and adequate consideration would
appear to have all the characteristics of a taxable gift.
9 3
Kimball H. Carey
91. A taxpayer can give away S3000 in any taxable year to any given donee before in-
curring any gift tax liability. I.R.C. § 2503. In addition to this annual exclusion, the pre-1977
law provided for a lifetime exemption of S30,000 per donor. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736,
§ 102(c)(l), 68A Stat. 410 (replaced by I.RLC. § 2505). Thus, by splitting their gifts, I.R.C.
§ 2513, a husband and wife could give away tax-free S6000 in annual installments, divided among
as many donees as they wished, plus S60,000 more in excess of these yearly amounts. The
S30,000 lifetime exemption has been replaced with a unified gift tax credit of $47,000 to be
phased in by 1981. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1849 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2505).
92. A change in the regulations might work to effect a shift in judicial thinking on this
subject, as appears to have happened in the case of § 482. 46 J. TAx. 375, 376 (19T7). See
also E. GRswoLD, CASES AND MA'TERIALS ON FEDEIRAL TAxrION 165 (6th ed. 1966).
93. For a recent commentary on Crown that reaches a different conclusion, see Frazier,
Interest-Free loans Between Family Members: What Practitioners Can Expect After Crown, 48
J. TAx 28 (1978). This article, which appeared as this Case Comment was going to print.
asserted, inter alia, that (1) the benefit conferred upon the recipient of an interest-free loan
does not constitute "property" for gift tax purposes, (2) at the instant that a demand loan is
made, the value of the promise to repay equals the amount of the loan, so that there is no gift
at that time, and (3) since the duration of a demand loan is uncertain, it is an "open" transaction
that, under prevailing gift tax principles, is not taxable until the loan is called in.
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